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Clean Air Litigation in a
Restructuring Electricity World
PETER LEHNER*
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer has taken a keen
interest in the issues surrounding energy and the environment.
Our Telecommunications and Energy Bureau has taken a number
of aggressive steps to ensure that consumers do not bear the brunt
but, rather, receive the benefits of restructuring. The Environ-
mental Protection Bureau has focused on ensuring that our en-
ergy supply is compatible with a clean and healthy environment.
Overall, we believe that it is critical that our energy policy
ensure three things: reliability, lower bills for consumers, and a
clean environment. The plan to ensure these objectives has at
least four elements. First, as I will discuss in more detail below,
we must ensure full compliance with the Clean Air Act (CAA) and
ensure that our current power supply is at least as clean as legally
required. We must also ensure that any new plants or any re-
started plants comply with the law and are as clean as necessary.
After all, allowing excessive pollution is like creating a subsidy for
dirty, inefficient power.
Second, we need new energy supplies and we should work to
ensure that new plants are the best for the community, the con-
sumer, and the environment. One approach to this is to encourage
the use of renewable energy sources, such as wind and solar
power. Recent studies suggest that New York State is remarkably
well situated to utilize both. Because New York gets most of its
sunshine during the same time as the electricity demand peaks -
the hot summer days - solar power offers significant opportunities
for reducing the sharp peaks that shift the entire demand curve
and, therefore, shift the price. In addition, many areas, such as
Long Island, have strong wind resources. Only recently an 11.5
megawatt wind farm opened in Madison, New York. Diversity in
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our energy supply can contribute to both reliability and price
stability.
The third element of a balanced energy policy is the reduction
of demand through efficiency investments. In the past, demand
side management (DSM) programs could be required in rate hear-
ings. The New York Public Service Commission (PSC) did this fre-
quently. The issue we confront now is how to ensure continued
efficiency investments in a restructured energy world.
Finally, we need to reform the signals that state laws send to
consumers and generators. With utility profits dependent on in-
creased sales, for example, the utilities have no incentive to re-
duce demand or to promote distributed generation. How can we
change these regulatory signals? Similarly, are the pricing mech-
anisms appropriate?
While the Attorney General's office has addressed and will
address all four elements of this strategy, as the state's chief law
enforcement office, our focus to date has been on ensuring that
existing and new power plants are in full compliance with the law.
Within this program element, our approach has been three-
fold. First, our office notified seventeen coal-fired power plants
located in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic regions of our intent to
sue them under the New Source Review (NSR)1 and Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD)2 provisions of the CAA. At ap-
proximately the same time, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) indicated a similar intent and filed notices of violations and
initiated numerous lawsuits. EPA is pursuing several of the same
companies as we are as well as several other facilities, including
those in the South and those run by the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity (TVA), that do not have as much of an impact on New York.
Following up on these notice letters, we filed several lawsuits that
are now either in active litigation or negotiation. Seven other
Northeastern states and several environmental organizations
have joined some of these lawsuits.3
Second, as we made clear when we initiated the out-of-state
cases, we are insisting that coal-fired power plants in New York
State fully comply with the CAA. Working with the New York
State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC), we
1. Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1994).
2. Id. §§ 160-169.
3. As of the printing of this article, we have reached an agreement in principle
with two companies, Virginia Electric Power Company and Cinergy Inc. We are nego-




served document requests or notices of violation on eight New
York plants. We are actively pursuing these cases as well.
Finally, we are looking into certain questions that have arisen
with respect to the re-start of old, uncontrolled plants and
whether these proposals are in accordance with the law. For ex-
ample, did the plants undergo a NSR analysis and install appro-
priate controls? We are also looking into questions that have been
brought to us regarding new plants and their compliance with the
law. For example, did they obtain the required air pollution off-
sets and from whom did they obtain them? Our inquiry is compli-
cated by our desire not to penalize new plants, all of which are
much cleaner than existing plants, nor to threaten necessary en-
ergy supply increases. Below, I focus on the first of these three
efforts, although the basic concepts are the same whether we are
addressing in-state or out-of-state plants.
In New York, we recognized the need for aggressive action to
control air pollution because of stubbornly high pollution levels
and respiratory disease rates in New York City and because of
increasing impacts of acid rain elsewhere. A number of federal
studies from acid rain, interstate ozone transport, and coastal
water quality programs indicated the severity of the problem, the
inadequacy of existing solutions and, critical for this discussion,
the major impact of pollutants from coal-fired power plants in up-
wind regions.
As we, and others, examined the issue further, it began to ap-
pear that many of these plants could be out of compliance with the
CAA. The CAA structure included a basic deal: new plants would
have to comply with stringent air pollution limits but old plants
would not, unless they underwent substantial modification. Con-
gress believed both that the old plants would soon be retired, and
that the best time to put on pollution controls was when other con-
struction was ongoing. As one court held, the purpose of the modi-
fication rule is to "insure that pollution control measures were to
be taken at the time they are most effective - at the time of new
or modified construction."4
Although Congress did grandfather existing sources, it in-
tended this to be a temporary measure. Congress also provided
that if any existing source made any physical or operational
change resulting in increased pollution, it would be de-
4. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 1990).
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grandfathered. It would have to install aggressive pollution con-
trols, called Best Available Control Technology (BACT).
It appeared that many power plants had indeed undergone
substantial modifications without installing pollution controls. To
examine this in more detail, and to identify specific plants that
could be in violation, the New York Attorney General's office un-
dertook an extensive investigation. We looked at several different
publicly available sources of information regarding coal consump-
tion, emissions, and generation.
We found the following pattern: first, decreasing coal con-
sumption as the plant aged; second, a sharp decrease, indicating
an extended outage; and third, a subsequent increase in coal con-
sumption, generation, and pollution. For example, at Paradise, a
TVA facility that EPA investigated, a sharp drop in coal consump-
tion and generation occurred in 1983-84. It turns out that TVA did
$60 million of upgrades at that time. Our investigations uncov-
ered similar patterns at many other power plants.
After getting a rough idea of possible violators using these
data sources, we examined Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion records, trade journals, company web sites, and manufac-
turer web sites to identify specific major modifications not
accompanied by new pollution controls. Manufacturers and utili-
ties often wanted to boast of their upgrades or life extension
projects. We also went to state public utility commissions to ex-
amine filings made by utilities when they sought favorable rate
treatment for the upgrades. The companies would explain that
certain investments were prudent as they allowed additional gen-
eration without the added cost of pollution controls.
This review gave us a great deal of detailed information that
convinced us that we had found significant and clear violations of
the CAA. The next step was to do something about those viola-
tions. In September 1999, we notified seventeen Midwestern
plants of our intent to sue. The following month, with the NYS-
DEC, we sent information requests to eight New York plants. (We
could demand documents from New York plants prior to litigation
since we have regulatory authority in-State. It was much harder
with out-of-state plants. With those plants, we either had to wait
until the discovery phase of litigation to obtain company docu-
ments or negotiate to obtain copies of documents given to EPA
pursuant to EPA's investigative authority.)
The plants we identified were not, in our view, outliers. They




menting rules, as interpreted by the courts. Critical to our cases
was the 1990 Seventh Circuit decision in Wisconsin Electric Power
Co. v. Reilly, known as WEPCO.5 The WEPCO court examined
the NSR provisions of the CAA, and EPA's regulations, and set
forth factors to use in interpreting the law. We kept our cases
within the WEPCO analysis.
Our cases were also consistent with the decision by the EPA
Environmental Appeals Board (EPA EAB), regarding the TVA
plants, that came down after we started the actions. 6 EPA had
served a Notice of Violation on TVA for numerous alleged CAA vio-
lations. Since both agencies are part of the federal government
and generally do not sue each other, that case moved forward ad-
ministratively and very quickly. In September 2000, the EPA
EAB issued a long detailed decision largely consistent with
WEPCO.
The CAA provides that if any facility, including a previously
grandfathered one, undertakes a "major modification" that causes
a "significant net emissions increase," then the facility must un-
dergo PSD/NSR review and install BACT.7 Both the WEPCO and
TVA decisions interpreted the phrases "major modification" and
"significant net emissions increase."8 Our cases fall squarely
within those decisions.
The CAA itself is quite broad. It defines a modification as
"any physical change, or change in the method of operation of, a
stationary source which increases the amount of any air pollutant
emitted."9 There is no exception in the statute for routine activi-
ties and the courts have understood that this definition was in-
tended to be broad. In 1979, the D.C. Circuit stated that "the
provisions concerning modifications indicate that this
[grandfathering] is not to constitute a perpetual immunity from
all standards under the PSD program. If these plants increase
pollution, they will generally need a permit."10
EPA, however, has decided by regulation to exempt "routine
maintenance, repair and replacement" from the definition of ma-
jor modification, first in 1976 in the New Source Performance
5. 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990).
6. In re Tennessee Valley Authority, 2000 EPA App. LEXIS 25, at *6 (Sept. 15,
2000).
7. Clean Air Act § 111(a)(4).
8. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 893 F.2d at 915; In re Tennessee Valley Authority,
2000 EPA App. LEXIS 25, at *151-52.
9. Clean Air Act § 111(a)(4).
10. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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Standard program," and then in 1980 in the NSR program. 12
EPA provided this exemption in order to make the program more
administratively feasible. As EPA later explained, absent such an
exception, the "definition of physical or operational change in
[CAA] Section 7411(a)(4) could, standing alone, encompass the
most mundane activities at an industrial facility (even the repair
or replacement of a single leaky pipe, or a change in the way that
pipe is utilized)."' 3
Note, however, that EPA's exemption was promulgated, and
must be read, in light of the earlier D.C. Circuit decision that
EPA's ability to exempt activities was limited to "de minimis" ac-
tivity.' 4 So only de minimis, routine activities could be exempted.
Even this reading is arguably generous to the regulated facilities.
Another D.C. Circuit decision held that, in the water pollution
context, EPA could not exempt even de minimis activities from
statutorily-mandated permitting requirements.' 5
EPA did not further define "routine maintenance, repair, or
replacement" in its regulation.' 6 Instead, it did so in its interpre-
tive memoranda and NSR determinations sent to industry in the
late 1980s. 17 This is where WEPCO and TVA come in: these pro-
ceedings affirmed these administrative interpretations, and thus
gave definite shape to this "routine maintenance" exemption.
With the WEPCO proceeding in 1988, and the Seventh Circuit af-
firmation of that decision in 1990, EPA determined that whether
an activity was routine should be determined by reference to four
aspects of the modification: (1) its nature and extent; (2) its pur-
pose; (3) its frequency; and (4) its cost.' A decade later, the EPA
EAB looked to the same four factors in the TVA decision.' 9 In
11. See 40 Fed. Reg. 58,416, 58,419 (Dec. 16, 1975).
12. See 43 Fed. Reg. 26,388, 26,404 (June 19, 1978) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.21(b)(2)(iii) (2001)).
13. 57 Fed. Reg. 32313, 32316-9 (July 21, 1992).
14. Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 355-61.
15. See Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
16. 57 Fed. Reg. 32313, 32316-9 (July 21, 1992).
17. See, e.g., Letter from Lee M. Thomas, Administrator, EPA, to John W. Boston,
Vice President, Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Oct. 14, 1988) (on file with author);
Memorandum from Don R. Clay, Acting Assistant Administrator for Air and Radia-
tion, EPA, to David A. Kee, Air and Radiation Division, EPA Region V (Sept. 9, 1988)
(on file with author).
18. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 893 F.2d at 910-911.




those cases, the court and the EPA EAB found that the target
modifications were not routine. 20
Looking at each of these considerations in more detail, evi-
dence regarding the nature and extent of the modification in-
cludes: (1) whether the item in question was a major component
(TVA had replaced reheaters, economizers, furnace wells and
other major components); (2) who performed the modification
(TVA work was not performed by maintenance staff, but by
outside contractors); (3) how long it took to plan and implement
the modification (the WEPCO work was performed during nine
month outages, rather than during normal, scheduled outages;
the TVA work required extensive planning and approvals); and (4)
whether the material needed was already on-site.
In examining the purpose of a modification, the WEPCO court
distinguished maintenance from work intended to "extend the life
expectancy" of the unit.21 The court noted the "historical practice
in the electric utility industry of replacing old plants (at the end of
their useful lives) with new plants, employing improved technolo-
gies and achieving improved efficiencies." 22 The "massive like-
kind replacement" at issue was intended to displace the need for a
plant, and thus was a far cry from simple maintenance. 23
Similarly, the TVA court found that the purpose of the work
was life extension. 24 "All projects were classified as 'capital'
rather than as 'maintenance' projects. TVA's Capitalization Policy
provides such classification for projects that add tangible new as-
sets or leave existing assets in 'better condition' than when the
original asset was installed for profitable service, but defines as
maintenance projects those projects that merely restore tangible
assets to serviceability."25
The focus of the frequency factor is on practice at the plant,
rather than in the industry. This was a major point of contention,
and still is, with industry actors claiming that an action is routine
if frequently performed throughout the overall industry. The
WEPCO court, however, relied on the fact that "the renovation
work items included on this application are those that would nor-
20. See id.; see also Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 893 F.2d at 912.
21. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 893 F.2d at 912.
22. Id. at 911.
23. Id.
24. See In re Tennessee Valley Authority, 2000 EPA App. LEXIS 25, at *267.
25. Id. at *107.
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mally occur once or twice during a unit's expected life cycle"26 in
finding that the work was not routine.2 7 Similarly, the TVA court
held that "although TVA introduced evidence that it and others in
the industry had made similar replacements at other facilities, the
evidence did not show that these replacements were other than
uncommon in the lifetime of a unit."28
In looking at the cost factor, relevant evidence includes
whether board of directors approval was required, how the
amount compared to average operation and management budgets,
and the absolute magnitude of the cost. In WEPCO and TVA,
projects ranging in cost from $2.6 to $17 million per unit were
found not to be routine. 29
If the modification is not routine, the next step in the legal
analysis is to determine if there is an emissions increase. (It is
important to emphasize in these days of concern for our energy
supply that the law only applies if there are increases in pollution.
A power plant can make any changes and increase production all
it wants without regard to NSR if there is no pollution increase.)
Again, the CAA broadly refers to any change "which increases the
amount of any pollutant emitted by such source or which results
in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted."3o
EPA narrowed the law again by requiring a "significant net" emis-
sions increase, which it in turn defined, for NO. and SO 2, as more
than forty tons per year in attainment areas and generally less in
nonattainment areas. 31
Even this definition, however, left it unclear how to calculate
the change in emissions. Without going into too much detail, and
noting that industry is challenging emission increase calculation
methodologies, the basic concept now for power plants is to com-
pare pre-modification actual emissions to the actual emissions as
they would be projected after the change. The past actual emis-
sions are relatively straight-forward to determine: the highest two
of the previous five years emissions, unless another period is more
representative.
26. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 893 F.2d at 912.
27. See id.
28. In re Tennessee Valley Authority, 2000 EPA App. LEXIS 25, at *108.
29. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 893 F.2d 901; In re Tennessee Valley Authority,
2000 EPA App. LEXIS 25.
30. Clean Air Act § 111(a)(4).




The post-change emissions, however, should be calculated
based on emissions increases that should have been projected at
the time of the change looking to the post-modification emission
rate (increased capacity) and the projected utilization (restored
availability).32 Moreover, in calculating these projected future ac-
tual emissions, any emission increases (at an electric generating
plant) due solely to increased demand, and unrelated to the physi-
cal change, should not be included in the calculation. 33 Thus, if a
company runs a plant more due to demand growth, that would not
be counted as an increase so long as it could have run the plant
more prior to the modification.
Even with these exceptions, we found in our preliminary in-
vestigation that the changes at issue in our cases resulted in sig-
nificant emissions increases. While the analysis of emissions is
still being refined in the cases under litigation as documents are
being made available by defendants, in the TVA case, the EPA
EAB found that emissions did increase under methods favorable
to industry at all units at which violations were alleged. 34
Putting all this together, our view was two-fold. First, the
EPA regulations and memoranda, together with the WEPCO and
TVA decisions did, in fact, lay out fairly clearly what was and was
not required. This understanding had been well established for a
decade or more, and industry was fully aware of it. Second, our
cases, which all involved massive life-extension or capacity en-
hancing projects, often intended to avoid the need for new genera-
tion capacity that would require pollution controls, were solid and
should be aggressively pursued.
Although our cases were, in our view, straightforward from
the vantage point of the NSRIPSD program, there were additional
complications due to the overlay of several CAA programs and the
restructuring of the energy industry.
The NSR/PSD program is a technology program. It requires
power plants to install technology. The acid rain program, a sepa-
rate CAA mandate, among other things imposes a national cap for
SO 2 emissions. 35 Each company would be allowed to emit as much
SO 2 as it had allowances for. These allowances were marketable
among power plants. We were faced with the possibility that,
32. However, for pre-1992 modifications, the appropriate test may be different
and look to post-modification potential emissions.
33. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(33)(ii).
34. In re Tennessee Valley Authority, 2000 EPA App. LEXIS 25, at *127-129.
35. See Clean Air Act § 405(d).
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without additional measures, we could succeed in requiring one
plant to put on a scrubber, and then find that the plant sold the
SO 2 allowances it thereby created to other plants. Net result
downwind: nothing. Thus, in the litigation, we would need to re-
tire SO2 credits as well.
Similarly, NO. is controlled under State Implementation
Plans (SIPs). These SIPs, under the federal NO, SIP call, will
likely impose state NO, caps. Again, if one plant installed pollu-
tion controls and reduced its NO, emissions, it could sell, or the
state could assign, those tons to another facility.
Finally, restructuring in the guise of wholesale competition
has meant that companies are reluctant to incur costs that their
competitors may not. It is no longer a question of getting PSC
approval. Although our litigation covers much of the market,
there are gaps. Also, different cases proceed at different speeds.
So when negotiating with one company, we always had to keep all
the others in mind.
So let me take this back to the beginning. Enforcement litiga-
tion is just one element of a balanced energy policy in a restructur-
ing world. Turning a blind eye to pollution is a subsidy to
precisely those actors that we do not want to encourage. We hope
our efforts will be matched by efforts to promote efficiency and
renewable power sources. And we hope that these cases will also
be matched by examination of other inappropriate regulatory sig-
nals we send, and efforts to revise them.
Thank you.
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